During the protests in Tunisia and Egypt, of which the collective Anonymous took a part, that same collective suddenly got other problems which, mostly, went unnoticed. Huge FBI crackdowns on essentially politically motivated protesters, with more arrests also in the UK. FBI crackdowns with big guns, disproportionate seizures of hardware (like, literally everything electronic in a household, including a toaster if they can, for something entirely trivial like LOIC installed on the one laptop securely positioned on the desktop of the teenage son) are not uncommon enough to cause any larger shockwave, which kind of goes together with my blogpost about Saudiarabian blog registration from last week. In the UK the government were prepared for backlashes after the arrests, which sure enough came and I note that there is ongoing resistance against identity probing performed by security firms.

The buzzwords of today are cybercrime, cybercrime-havens, cyberespionage and cyberwar, all of which require crackdowns. In the fog of cyberwar it is difficult not to imagine a pan-European defense force.

Please explain to me the irony of Commissioner Franco Frattini waging war on cybercrime in 2007. Never mind. I get it.

While Commissioner Malmström does not appear in an awful lot of press releases in comparison with her legislative activities, she has recognised the threat of zombie computers.

Coupled with a Swedish commentator observing that it's very easy for normal citizens to sabotage infrastructure I worry a lot about a suggested article 4 of the upcoming directive on unauthorized access:

Article 4 Illegal system interference

Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional serious hindering or interruption of the functioning of an information system by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering, suppressing or rendering inaccessible computer data is punishable as a criminal offence when committed without right, at least for cases which are not minor.

I hesitate to see the actions of normal citizens as a sabotage of infrastructure - essentially much of what has happened lately involving suppressing or rendering inaccessible computer data by, well, autonomously organised citizens has been temporary blockades which in no way affect the operations of the infrastructure after the blockade has ended (correct me if I'm wrong). However, his suggestions appear to include sturdier infrastructure which I choose to interpret as more (and primarily more available) fibre rings, better access to unlimited bandwidth and better fibre-to-the-home connections. It is difficult not to welcome and condone further improval and primarily, as must be the point of referencing Estonia, the creation of more Tier 1-providers on European soil.

But in a world of darkness and despair for politicians around the planet, a source of hope for our legislators ought to be that OECD has concluded that cyberwar is not a big risk. Bruce Schneier gracefully reveals to legislators and the public that the cyberwar is finally over. I hope no public institutions interprets this as a reason not to invest in FTTH and accessibility to bandwidth.

Speaking of wars and their various dangerous combattants, teenage soldiers from the opposing troops are often arrested in the war for copyright.